Introduction
A
phenomenological
approach
to the question of artificially producing and patenting organic life
may
make more plausible why, on the one hand, this question is possible and
legitimate and why, on the other hand, we should not give up the
efforts to perceive and draw limits to modern technology. Such limits
may
appear less arbitrary if they arise from an insight into what seems to
be unbalanced as soon as a broader perspective is taken into
consideration.
Phenomenology is related to empirical research insofar as it intends to
clarify conceptual differences on the basis of what appears to
make
a difference. Its main utility is of the kind to make us aware about
what
sometimes remains hidden when one
perspective is highlighted (1).
The
question
regarding the production of
organic life has roots in Greek philosophy. Plato postulated a division
(chorismos) between the physical and the metaphysical,
i.e.,
between the place where sensible objects are located and sensually
perceived
(topos aisthetos) and the eternal world of ideas (topos
noetos). Usually the difference between the Platonic and the
Aristotelian conception of this division is characterised by the sense
that Plato conceived ideas (idea) as having a higher kind of
reality
while Aristotle postulated a knowledge process wherein such forms or
essences (eidos) were mentally abstracted from natural beings (physei
onta).
Both conceived the nature of numbers (arithmos) as well as
geometrical
figures as separate from natural beings (2). In his Physics
Aristotle makes a detailed analysis of the
nature of numbers
and points (3). His thinking on the difference between
natural beings (physei onta), points (stigme) and unity (monas)
can be summarised as follows:
- Natural
beings:
are determined
by unity (hen), place (topos), and position (thetos)
- Points: are
determined
by non-place (atopos), position (thetos) and contact (syneches,
continuum)
- Unity: is
characterised
by non-place (atopos) and non-position (athetos)
In
other words,
there is
a removal of points and numbers from natural beings and of their
perception.
While points and geometrical figures can be sensibly perceived (aisthesis),
numbers are only accessible through conceptual reason (logos, nous).
This also means that human beings are not only able to perceive in a
pre-determined
way the natural world, as in the case of all other living beings
deprived
of reason (alogoi), but also to construct a world of meaning
through which
we may grasp beings in their being, as well as produce artificial
beings on
the basis of ideas. Although Aristotle was concerned with the process
of
abstracting points and numbers from natural beings, his thinking was logos-oriented
(4). Greek physis refers to the process of what
unveils or generates itself and whose origin (arche) is
therefore
not within the power of human beings (5). But at the same
time there is the mythical and Platonic conception of a divine cosmic
builder
(demiourgos), a kind of pottery god that produces things
in a way similar to the human use of techne,
although much more perfect (6). In other words, the Greek concept of physis
is twofold. This view of nature changes in Modernity as nature is
conceived
within the possibility of human mathematical calculation. These kinds
of
world-view changes are called "paradigmatic" after Thomas S. Kuhn (7).
Paradigm shifts are not only of an epistemological but also of an
ontological
nature. The concept of ontology is now used with regard to the human
capacity
of world construction on the basis of the awareness of our
being-in-the-world (8).
I.
A Phenomenology of Organic Life
Natural
beings,
including human
beings, are generated by a process whose origin retreats itself
in the very process of its disclosure. Thus it is not
possible to get a complete explanation of what naturally comes forth.
When
considering nature we usually take the evolutionary viewpoint starting
from the less complex and looking for the qualitative changes of what
is
or was already there. The place of such processes of natural
disclosure
is usually called the world. Non-living things, a stone for
instance,
are no less in the world as a stem cell, a dog, a computer, a work of
art,
a human being or a political party. But at the same time we
intuitively
grasp that there is a difference concerning the ways things are in the
world. Although living organisms in general and human beings in
particular
are open to the groundless ground that gives them their being,
in
the sense that they are delimited by coming-into-life and
going-into-death,
they do not relate to it –
as far as we know –
in the same way. Human
beings
are aware of this coming-forth and of the groundless ground that
generates
them. This makes them responsible for their own being in the sense that
they must accept that they cannot simply do what they want due to the
fact
that their will and knowledge are basically finite. To want the
impossible
was called by the Greek hybris. The problem is that we often do
not know if, for instance, the consequences of our actions may create
an impossible situation, i.e., a situation in which our own
being is headed for its destruction. It is not only existentially but
also
logically
impossible that a will can will and not will at the same time.
These
few
remarks on the condition humaine give us a hint concerning the
specificity of our
being-in-the-world. Instead of being to a great extent bound to our own
as well as to other natural beings, we are in a position that allows us
to grasp what comes forth as what it is and to be able to
behave
according to it or not. In other words, we are open to a field of
possibilities
before we explicitly address things as this or that. If we use the term
world not as synonym for the planet earth but for this
very specific
kind of free relationship that allows us to weave a network of
relations
between ourselves (and our selves!) as well as between the things
surrounding us or produced by us, we may find it plausible to call, as
Heidegger
does, the way human beings are as "world-forming" ("weltbildend"),
while
animals are "world-poor" ("weltarm"),
and a stone is "worldless"
("weltlos") (9).
"World-poor"
means, on the
one hand, that we can shift into the world of animals but not vice
versa. This asymmetric relationship makes the difference with
regard
to our being with other human beings with whom we originally share a meaningful
world. We can make this kind of assertion about animal life only ex
negativo. But, on the other hand, "world-poor" does not mean, as
Heidegger
remarks, "that life ("Leben")
with regard to human existence ("Dasein")
is of a poorer quality or a lower level. Rather is life a field with an
own
richness of openness that probably the human world does not know
about." (10) Heidegger describes this peculiar openness
of animal life as a drive ("Trieb")
– usually we call it instinct
– to lose inhibition and remain basically in a dazed state
("Benommenheit").
In other words, animals and more generally, organisms are
primarily
characterized neither by a multiplicity of parts or organs (Greek organon
= instrument) nor of isolated drives, but by the unity
of
a "ring-like" structure (11). "World-poor" means that
organisms do have an openness but that this openness is not
of the kind of human world-openness. "Poor" means this "not having" a
world
on the basis of having their own kind of dazed ring-like openness.
According
to
Heidegger, this
(by no means exhaustive) concept of organic life says more about
ourselves
than about organic life itself as it is basically negative, starting
from
our own way of being. Thus he makes a distinction
between
an indifferent "not-having a world" and a qualitative assertion about
"being
world-poor." Organisms "lacking a world" is a "negative" assertion that
can only be made with regard to a philosophical "positive" pre-view of
human life as being-in-the-world (12). To be (in) such
a "world-poor" disclosure also means that non-human animal life lacks
the possibility of a relationship with what makes its
coming-into-existence
as a "des-inhibition within a ring-structure" possible, although this
process
may provoke a "basic shuttering" ("wesenhafte
Erschütterung")
(13).
An
organism is
not merely
constituted by the sum of its cells but by a specific kind of unity
that
is different from the unity of an instrument ("Zeug") or of a machine
("Maschine").
In other words, Heidegger critizises a pure mechanistic
conception
of organic life. An instrument is related to its possible use within a whole
network of relationships ("Bewandtnisganzheit"),
i.e., on the
basis of a plan. A machine is an instrument whose structure is a
sequence
of autonomous movements (14). An instrument refers to
a capacity ("Fertigkeit"), an
organ to a capability ("Fähigkeit").
Eyes are, consequently, not just instruments installed in the heads of
animals. They belong to an organism in the sense that they are
generated
by the capability of an organism. An instrument may acquire a capacity,
an organism as "'the being-capable-of' provides itself with organs"
(15). The capability of an organ concerns its "usability"
("Diensthaftigkeit")
in contrast to the "utility" ("Dienlichkeit")
of an instrument. An
organism
produces itself and its organs on its own. It guides or lives by itself
and regenerates itself within certain limits. There is nothing like a
drive
to hammer in a hammer. An instrument as well as a machine are produced
by a human inventor, they need operating instructions for their use and
they cannot repair themselves (16).
This
is not a
plea for Aristotelian
entelechy or for vitalist philosophy. It is just a phenomenological
insight
into the difference between natural genesis and technological
production.
The priority of the capability in relation to organs has been recently
discovered with regard to stem cells (17). Finally Heidegger
points to the difference between organs and instruments not only with
regard
to the place and the way of their generation or production but also
with
regard to time: "In the case of organs it is indeed not indifferent how
long they exist and when they are generated." (18) They
do not relate to the living time of a particular organism, but to their
life-time
capability.
The
capability
to be "world-poor"
is a condition of possibility for the generation of organic life. This
is, a fortiori, the case of a "world-forming" being. We are
indebted,
in other words, to the world-openness itself for being the kind of
beings
capable of corresponding to it. Our organs are therefore not just of
the
same kind, as they are embedded within another kind of capability that
Heidegger
calls "behaviour" ("Verhalten")
in contrast to animal "dazed state"
("Benommenheit").
At the same time there is not a fundamental division between being
human
and other non-human organic life as far as we are also inserted in the
"ring-like" structure of "living nature" "which holds us as captive in
a very specific way." (19) This is also the reason why
we are able to behave ecologically (or not), i.e., to develop a
kind
of thinking that allows us to correspond to the capabilities of natural
beings. If we are free to do this, it is because we are able to
co-respond
to the call of the world-openness or indeterminacy itself which
is indeed a finite call as we are aware of our natality and
mortality.
In other words, a phenomenological approach is both transparent and
opaque.
II.
Technology within a Phenomenological Context
The
computer is
not just a technical
device among others but a kind of pervading and fuzzy framework that
influences
not only our scientific methods, but also our everyday life. Being
human
is becoming more and more a matter of being online. As scientists we
live
also in a digital environment in the sense that we use the computer as
a basic device through which we grasp and transform our
research
objects. We believe we understand these objects when we examine them
not just with
regard
to their mathematical calculability but also with regard to
their digitability. What is, is potentially digital. Esse
est computari.
This does not mean necessarily that non-digital objects become digital
ones, but that the way we look at them, i.e., the way we cast their
being
is based on digital technology. The origin of today's digital casting
of
being goes back, as I have shown, to the Greek conception of numbers
and
points as separated or abstracted (chorismos) from natural
beings
(physei onta). The peculiarity of digital information technology
is the in-formation of numbers and points in the
electromagnetic
medium (20). This means that when we project
natural beings within the digital horizon we displace and may even
replace
them by points and numbers that we inscribe or programme in the digital
medium, the computer. There is a difference between digital ontology
and
digital metaphysics. From a metaphysical point of view, the real is the
digital and vice versa. Digital ontology concerns our understanding
of being. We believe that we understand something in its being when we
are able to project or pro-gram it digitally. Digital ontology
is
not the only possibility of grasping beings in their being, but it is,
I believe, the dominating view today.
If
we
take the
view of the
object from its possibility of being-digital and programmable, the
properties
of the object and consequently of the subject are reduced to numbers
and
points within the electromagnetic medium. Some results are, for
instance,
genetic data banks or the idea of reprogramming adult stem
cells.
But the issue is more basic. It concerns a paradigm shift within
biology insofar as the concept of genetic information becomes a
leading
one.
I call this view of nature a postal paradigm –
which is related
to a science of messages or angeletics –
since it is based
on
the
idea of (non-human) messengers passing-by different kinds of codes.
Indeed
the whole organism is viewed as processing the genetic code. This means
in some way a dissolution of the modern subject at least as far as they
may
conceive themselves as a product – and not any more as an a
priori
condition –
of their own genetic and digital techne (21). It
seems as if post-modern subjectivity is looking for a solution of this
dilemma.
This
is indeed
a legitimate
perspective but it is not the only one, and indeed it can lead to
disregard for
other perspectives or a looking at them from this viewpoint alone. It
is
our choice to challenge the dominance of an ontological perspective
particularly
when it becomes a dominating one. This is not just because other
legitimate
perspectives may not be perceived or may even be considered as
illegitimate,
but also because the very fact of our openness to indeterminacy as
such –
what in the modern tradition was called human freedom – may
not be seen
as our unique way of being. This challenge of an ontological
perspective
may lead to radical changes in the way we design our individual
and social life. Examples of such changes of ontological perspectives
and
of their practical consequences are for instance the shift from a
metaphysical
and theological conception of being into a mathematics-based
conception
of nature in modernity or the influence of dialectical materialism in
the
last two centuries. The predominance of an ontological perspective does
not mean that every scientist or even every individual actually shares
it. Newton's conception of nature was highly influential for centuries
although only a few people understood his theory. The influence of an
ontological
paradigm is more of a general atmosphere that pervades a whole culture
or epoch.
I
would like to
suggest a
phenomenological view of this technological paradigm within other
dimensions
by considering:
-
Natural
beings,
i.e., what
comes forth out of what unveils itself (physis) disclosing
"world-less," "world-poor" and "world-building" beings.
-
Human beings,
i.e., natural
beings capable of building a world and co-responding to the
world-openness
that constitute their own being as coming-into-the-world (natality) and
going-into-death (mortality).
- Technology, i.e.,
human
knowledge (techne) on how to produce artificial things including
the possibility of transforming natural ones.
- The Divine, i.e.,
a dimension
beyond human natality and mortality, nature and technology.
- The
world-openness, i.e.,
the (finite) place where the other dimensions unveil themselves.
We
may consider
the predominance
of, for instance, the dimension of the Divine or of nature (physis)
in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, or the humanistic view since
Modernity.
But this is not a plea for any kind of philosophy of history based on
such
a paradigm shift. Instead, we may look at the different possibilities
of
projecting every perspective within the horizon of one of them leading
to, respectively, naturalism, humanism, technocracy – or, in the case
of
information technology, cyber-gnosis – and religious
fundamentalism.
The world-openness itself as the finite space-time of our existence
that
allows us to criticize such one-sided perspectives not by
negating
one or all of them – what we could call nihilism – but by
considering
and respecting them in their own way of being. In other words, this
phenomenological
view is not a view, as it may prima facie look like, of the
whole
of reality, i.e., it is not a metaphysical view, but just a relative
view of the tensions between nature, humanity, technology and the
Divine.
I
believe that
such a relative
view is only possible if we let the middle of these four dimensions,
i.e.,
the world-openness itself, as a finite openness, i.e., without
filling
it with any one of the other dimensions. The philosophical tradition of
modernity has called this finite dimension freedom and human
dignity. Within this phenomenological context such concepts are not
based on a religious or metaphysical basis but on our being able to
co-respond
to the world-openness that constitutes our lives. Within this
perspective
human beings cannot be treated just as objects not primarily
because
they are subjects, but because they are given as this
world-openness
itself which is the condition of possibility for the encounter of an
object
and a subject.
With
today's
predominant
digital ontology –
in case my perception of this phenomenon is correct –
we have to do with a perception of nature, including our own being,
that
has its roots not only in Greek chorismos-thinking about the
nature
of numbers and points and their abstraction from natural beings (physei
onta), but also in the modern conception of human being as a
subject
capable of constituting (empirical) objects as its epistemological objectum
proprium, i.e., as the basic structure that determines our
knowledge
and its limits.
The
process of
producing
artificial beings was called by Aristotle poiesis and the
knowledge
how to produce them techne. Aristotle made also a difference
between poiesis and praxis, i.e., between the process
of
producing
artificial beings and the process of human action whose finality
remains
within the acting person. The specific kind of knowledge
corresponding
to praxis was called by Aristotle phronesis which can
be
translated as prudential or ethical thinking in the sense that human
action
is not concerned with what is necessary or absolute but with what is
possible
within the realm of what is supposed to be the best for human
existence
as a whole (ta anthropina, eu zen) (22). Aristotle
makes a difference between the kind of technical reflection with regard
to
the possibilities of human action (techne ethike) and the
customs
or rules that actually constitute the moral life (ethos). To
know
the good is not the same as to be good, which is indeed the final
purpose
of ethics as a reflection on morality (23).
With
Descartes' ego
cogito
and Kant's transcendental subject, modernity makes a turn with regard
to
Greek and Medieval ontology. According to Kant, the conditions of
possibility
of experience are at the same time conditions of possibility of the
objects
of experience (24). Kant himself draws a theoretical
and a practical limit to modern subjectivity. The conditions of
possibility
of experience are not "the" but just "conditions of possibility" of the
objects of experience. There is a balance between the conception of what
is given – a vague remembrance of Greek physis – and the
active
part of the human subject. This corresponds to the difference between
an
original intelligence ("intellectus archetypus") and a
derivative
one ("intellectus ectypus") (25). The second limit
concerns the practical dimension. While the utilitarian and
naturalistic
view aims at balancing objects and their properties with regard to the
well-being of the subject, Kant postulates a measure that is indeed inside
the subject but at the same time beyond a person's will. A person's
moral
(and
mortal) destiny is therefore coupled with an imperative
that categorically states that their being is not identical
with their
empirical nature ("homo phaenomenon") but has a specific dignity
("Würde")
or an "internal value" ("innerer Wert")
and not just a price ("Preis")
as far they, as homo noumenon, are part of a transcendent
(not
just transcendental) community ("Reich
der Zwecke") (26).
In other words, the concept and the reality of being human is twofold,
according
to Kant. There are traces of this Kantian dualism for instance
in the German Constitution (27).
We
are indeed
able to co-respond
and therefore to be responsible with regard to nature, the Divine,
technology
and to our own (natural) being. Considering ourselves through
technology,
i.e., through the intellectual process of producing objects, we become
(and
became!) subjects. Considering ourselves with regard to nature,
we become (and became!) natural products. Considering ourselves with
regard
to the Divine we become (and became!) God's creatures. But, indeed, we
may thus overview the very fact of our own existence (vita humana)
as a life-span of open possibilities that makes of us finite
world-builders
and therefore responsible for our lives. Neither the world nor the
other
dimensions are just the product of our productive knowledge (techne).
To treat them just as such is unethical because to will this would mean
the destruction of what comes forth from itself, which includes
our own being as natural beings. In Kantian terms, this is something we
cannot will because in this case the will would destroy
its own
conditions of possibility (28).To will the impossible
is, in other words, hybris. The project of Modernity is not of
the
kind that it may provide by itself a kind of "orientation knowledge"
beyond
instrumentality (29).
III.
Legitimacy and Limits of Producing and Patenting Organic Life
The
constitution
of the modern
subject makes possible that invented objective properties
or
methods for producing natural or artificial objects may also become
private property of the subject. The copyright and the patent
system are,
in other words, modern systems. We look at nature, including our own,
within
the horizon of technology and today digital technology in particular.
In order for an invention, a method or a product, to be protected by a
patent with regard to its possible commercial exploitation,
the
inventor must create a difference with regard to what is naturally
there, i.e., to a discovery. Other criteria concern the novelty of the
invention
as well as its industrial application. In other words, inventions
concern
the artificial.
According
to
Negrotti (30),
the artificial is not the opposite of the natural but of anything
that is considered an original and with regard to which
changes
in its structure and/or substance are undertaken. Such an original can
be, for instance, a technical device, a living organism, or a natural
organ.
In this last case we can artificially transform its capabilities into
capacities
of an instrument. And we look correspondingly at its utility instead
of
its usability. We can, on the one hand, interfere in a natural process
in medicine, agriculture, forestry, cattle breeding... having nature as
the horizon of our action. But we also can, on the other hand, consider
natural processes within a technological context.
What
is
ethically problematic
about this technological transformation and dislocation of organic life
in general and about the question of patenting it in particular? I use
the word problematic in the Kantian sense. According to Kant problematic
concepts are those whose object we cannot know about. For the kind
of questions arising from them there is no solution ("Lösung"),
but
only a dissolution ("Auflösung")
of the problem, i.e., a basic
distinction
like the one between the empirical and the transcendental (31).
There are two problematic concepts related to the question of the
artificial
production of organic life:
1.
Non-human
natural organisms
and organs as artificial products.
2. The human
body
and human
organs as artificial products.
The
idea of a
natural being
as an artificial product is indeed a problematic one insofar as we have
no possibility of artificially producing natural beings as such.
We can just transform in a more or less radical manner natural
organisms
or their organs, creating artificial ones or, of course, to produce all
kind of artificial products, similar or not to natural ones. In other
words,
the concept of an artificially produced natural product is an oxymoron.
The reason for this is that neither are human beings the original
producers
of natural organisms nor can we get, consequently, a knowledge (techne)
about their own origin. To paraphrase Heraclitus's famous
aphorism,
nature constantly retreats into itself in the very moment of its
space-time
disclosure (32). A "dissolution" of the antinomy between
the natural and the artificial or between nature and human techne
on the basis of a radical dualism between both spheres is itself
problematic insofar as the real and clear boundaries become blurred in
some cases
and
transparent in other. In other words, it may be difficult to see the
difference
that makes a difference between the artificial and the natural. Thus,
the
dissolution of the antinomy remains often a conceptual one without fundamentum
in re.
The
transformation of natural
organisms may also concern the process of isolating them from their
natural
space-time context. The transformed product as well as the methods for
its transformation and dislocation can be object of a patent. How
far will these transformations distort, for better or for worse,
natural
balances? What are the consequences concerning our sensibility for
natural
organisms and processes? Both questions are the core of ecological
arguments.
How far may patents on artificially transformed natural organisms or
parts
of them create new incentives for industry or increase tensions and
inequity
between rich and poor? There are no overall answers to these questions.
They
become
even more crucial
with regard to the question about the artificial production and
patenting
of the human body and its organs. The idea of producing artificially a
human body is, even more than in the general case of natural organisms,
a problematic concept. Nevertheless the concept of cyborg
has a strong influence – beyond science fiction (33).
The body is the primordial medium of our being-in-the-world. We can
only
in a derivative way take a distance from it and make it an object of
research
within, for instance, the digital casting, isolating it from the
original
being-in-the-world-with-others or life-world. This isolation is
the precondition for its commercialization, as in the case of slavery.
Human will cannot universalize this maxim without implying its own
dissolution.
A purely objective view of the human body oversees the way in
which
humans as "world-builders" bodily share with others the space-time
openness
of a common world.
The
instrumental view of
human organs is one of the most controversial points in the present
bio-ethical
debate. This concerns, for instance, the question of organ
transplantation
and recently the question of the production and use of human embryos
for
different purposes other than natural ones. Human embryos are our
natural
origin and they are embedded within our social and sexual life. They
deserve
a special care and respect particularly in case we make differences
between
the kind of being we are in the different stages of our
coming-into-the-world.
This question concerns time: "when is a human being a human being?" and
space: "what kind of being are we in the different places of our
coming-in-the-world?"
We may artificially interfere at different stages of this process and
isolate,
change, use and even destroy what nature brings forth. Of course,
nature
itself produces and destroys fertilized eggs, and it would be an
impossible
moral and legal obligation to take care of any naturally
produced
and destroyed embryo on the basis of the idea that it deserves our absolute
care before nature discards it.
This
reasoning
ad absurdum
is not an argument in favour or against any kind of use or
misuse
of human life at this early stage, as for instance through different
artificial
forms of preventing its further development. Following the Thomistic
distinction
between actio humana and actio hominis, i.e., between
human
action as governed (or not) by reason and free will (34),
we can make a difference between vita humana (Greek bios)
and vita hominis (Greek zoe) The question about the
process
of becoming a reasonable and free being, i.e., a being co-responding to
the world-openness, is related, from a Thomistic point of view, to the
idea of anima intellectiva as forma corporis (35),
and implies that the embryo as vita hominis has the potential
of vita humana. Why shouldn't we produce and use human
embryos for
other purposes than the natural ones? Because we would
contradict
our own (potential) being. The capability of a human embryo to
become
a human being makes the specific difference to a view that transforms
the
embryo into an instrument with specific capacities and looks at
the utility of stem cells for the growing organism from the
point
view of their instrumental usability.
But
let us
consider the case
of so-called supernumerary embryos from IVF (in-vitro fertilisation) –
which is, indeed, an artificial dislocation of the embryo
– and their use as a source for pluripotent stem cells. It is an open
question,
how far adult stem cells can be reprogrammed in order to
develop
a similar range of potentialities as embryonic stem cells. The idea of
reprogramming cells is a sign of the influence of the information
paradigm
in biology and, more generally, of our view of nature within the
background
of digital ontology. The methods for artificially breeding
stem cells as well as the artificially modified cells (and cell
lines) themselves can be objects of patent claims but the indirect
instrumentalisation and commercialisation of the embryo is
existentially
and therefore ethically questionable not only from a
preformistic
but also from an epigenetic position. Healing expectations may
provide
a, in Kantian terms, problematic support for research and
therapeutic
use of stem cell lines from embryonic origin (36). Problematic
means that we should not give up the tension between (human) nature and
technology allowing any kind of instrumentalisation,
privatisation
and commercialization of the human body and its artificially
(re-)produced
organs. In other words, we should be cautious. Prudentia is a
virtue
that may advise us in a given situation to weaken technological visions
(and nightmares) for whatever purposes, supporting, instead, natural
processes or vice versa.
Conclusion
Why
should we
respect nature
in a technological civilization? Basically, because it is. This is not
a naturalistic fallacy but a recognition of one basic dimension of what
appears in the world-openness. It is for us, natural beings, not
possible
not to respect nature without paying for this with our own dissolution.
This is something we cannot will. This argument is neither
metaphysical
nor religious. It is a weak argument. It allows to recognize us
at the same time as co-responding primarily to the world-openness in
which,
or, better, as which we appear. We are this given
world-openness
itself between natality and mortality. This finite response allows us
to
be responsible with regard to what may appear either coming out from
itself –
as in the case of nature, including our own natural being, or the
Divine –
as well as to what we artificially produce and change (poiesis)
on the basis of our knowledge (techne) of what we believe to be
the case, our ontological castings.
Today
we may
take a one-sided
technocratic perspective without paying attention to a specificity of
human
existence (vita humana) which is indeed its unique plasticity. Anima
quodammodo omnia (37). From our co-response
to finitude arises not only a calm but even a cool view of our present
and future experiments with ourselves. Human beings are not only homo
faber but also homo faber sui ipsius as the theologian Karl
Rahner wrote with regard to what at that time (1965) was just in its
beginning,
namely self-manipulation in the "factory buildings" ("Werkhalle") of
biology,
biochemistry and genetics, medicine and psychology, sociology and
political
science (38). According to Rahner the root of self-manipulation
is freedom. If until now we manipulated ourselves and our selves mainly
in a moral and theoretical way, we start now transforming ourselves as
a historical and physical being. We are not only culturally but
also bodily open beings. Beyond the moralistic position which says we
should
not do everything we can, and the pessimist who doubts we would follow
any reasonable advice, Rahner suggests: humans should do what they can
– because it would be absurd to will the impossible. This is indeed a
Kantian
argumentation. The consequence is, on the one hand, that we may create
a situation with irreversible and irreparable consequences. Rahner
criticizes,
on the other hand, resignation in view of death and human finitude.
Self-manipulation
arises within the given frontiers of natality and mortality, i.e.,
within
dimensions beyond manipulation. They point to the question
concerning
the Divine.