Introduction
The
question
about the relation
between ethics and public policy has a long tradition in Western
philosophy.
In the first part of this paper I will briefly refer to the classic
(Aristotle)
as well as the modern traditions (Hobbes, Kant). In the second part I
address
the issue of the role of public ethics committees. The establishment of
ethics committees as part of the political system in conjunction with
the
possibilities offered by mass-media and the Internet allows ethics to
be
in between the political sphere and the civil society.
Today's
digital
networked
environment – including individual media, mass media and the Internet –
changes the production, distribution, and use of ethical discourse not
only with regard to ancient oral societies but also with regard to
Modernity
as based on printing technology. Political ethics conceived as a
discourse
in between public policy and society opens the possibility not only to
reflect publicly on the foundations of morality including its legal
fixation,
but also to give politicians a space of reflection beyond the
constraints
of political parties. Finally I will present as an example the
organisation
and activities of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies
(EGE), a
consulting body of the European Commission.
1
Ethics
and Public Policy in the Western Tradition
Aristotle
situated ethics within practical philosophy as related to
politics opposing it to Plato's identity between both
fields [Bien 1983]. In the first book of the "Politics" he deals with economics,
i.e., with questions concerning the administration of the house (oikos)
and the family and he denies the Platonic conception of speaking
synonymously
about community (koinonia) with regard to the city as well as to
the family. Later on it became a scholarly approach to conceive
practical
philosophy as consisting of three sub-disciplines, namely ethics,
economics
and politics, although Aristotle himself is not primarily concerned
with
the creation of such a triadic system. He distinguishes the private
from
the public sphere in contrast to the Platonic view that in a good
organised
city everything should be common to everybody. The unity of the city
is,
in other words, not of the same kind as the unity of the house or the
unity
of a single person [Pol. II, 2, 1261 a 18-22]. This pertains, mutatis
mutandis, also the question of happiness. According to Aristotle it
is not possible to conceive the happiness of the state as a whole
without
considering at the same time that everybody or the majority or, at
least,
some people may become happy [Pol. II, 2, 1264 b 15-19]. Plato's polis
is a big family based on love and friendship while Aristotle treats
friendship
as an ethical virtue in the "Nichomachean Ethics," i.e., he
distinguishes
the spheres of the individual and the polis without separating
them
completely. The medium that allows the passage between the spheres is
language
(logos).
In
the first
book of the
"Politics" Aristotle states that human beings are the only living
beings
"bearing language" (logon echei) which means that we can
communicate
with or "disclose" (deloun) to each other not only what is
useful
or damaging but also what is just or unjust. He concludes saying that
"the
commonality (koinonia) in these affairs creates the house and
the
state" [Pol. I, 2, 1253 a 18]. Only gods or wild animals can live alone
[Pol. I, 2, 1253 a 9-30]. We can become good citizens and good persons
through critical thinking (phronesis) and virtue (arete)
within the legal framework of the state. But the virtues of civic life
are not the same as the virtues of good life. Everybody should strive
to
become a good citizen (polites spoudaios) but this does not
necessarily
imply that one would become a good person (aner agathos) and vice
versa, becoming a good person is not identical with becoming a good
citizen within a given state constitution [Pol. III, 4, 1276 b 16 -
1277
a 5].
In
some states the virtues
necessary to become a good person are
the same as the ones to become a good citizens, but in other states
they
are not. And even in an ideal state the virtues of a person and the
ones
of a citizen coincide only in the case of the state leader or the
community
of state leaders "taking care of the common affairs" (tes ton koinon
epimeleias) [Pol. III, 5, 1278 b 1-3]. The polis is indeed
not
only based on law but also on the ethical virtue of friendship (philia)
"which has to do with the same kind of things and persons as the law"
[NE
VIII, 11, 1159 b 26-27] but friendship is of different kind within
various
political systems and social relations. Political friendship does not
presuppose
that everything should be common to everybody, and for this reason
Aristotle
criticises Plato's state [Pol. II, 5]. In other words, the polis
is conceived as a legal as well as a moral community (koinonia)
of free and equal citizens which means, for instance, the exclusion of
slaves [Pol. III, 9, 1280 a 31]. Its final aim is not just living but
good
living (eu zen) [Pol. III, 9, 1280 b 33].
The
Aristotelian conception
of the relation between ethics and public policy stresses the idea that
the passage between moral and the political sphere is done through
language
as the constitutive medium of the polis. We are naturally a
political
being (anthropos physei politikon zoon), i.e., we create a moral
and legal state on the basis of language in contrast to other living
beings
[Pol. I, 2, 1253 a 1-10]. Aristotle points in this context to
oral
speech (phone). The polis is indeed primarily an oral
and
moral society based on written laws. What is written is only the
general
(katholou). Then, according to Aristotle, it is impossible to
determine
every specific action (praxis) in detail (akribos). The
political
order (politike taxis) concerns the general and the particular (kath'
hekaston). Through oral and written deliberation as discussed by
Aristotle
in his "Rhetoric", we may "cautiously" (eulabeia) change written
laws in order not to suggest that they should not be taken seriously
but
to indicate that in fact it takes a lot of time until they become
customary
[Pol. II, 1269 a 22 ff]. Written laws are based on political morality
or ethos and could be changed through ethical deliberation.
The
relation
between the
citizen and the person changes dramatically with the arrival of
Modernity.
Hobbes' "Leviathan" is a rational and artificial institution in
contrast to the ancient polis which has a natural and moral form
of living. He writes:
"NATURE (the Art whereby God hath made and
governes
the World) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this
also
imitated, that i can make an Artificial Animal (...) For by Art is
created
that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine
CIVITAS)
which is but an Artificiall Man" [Hobbes 1985, 81]. The political body
is defined as "the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity
of the Represented" [Hobbes 1985, 220]. The "finall Cause, End, or
Designe
of men, who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others)" is not
"good
life" but the institution by "covenant" of a "Common-Wealth" through
which
the original "condition of Warre" may be overcome [Hobbes 1985,
223].
Hobbes
postulates a fundamental difference between the individuals
under
the "Lawes of Nature" and their life under the commands of the
Leviathan.
The moral substance of the polis is usurped by the Sovereign
who
represents by his own unity the "Multitude". Ethos and,
correspondingly,
ethical deliberation disappear. As Rüdiger Bubner remarks, the
modern contractual theory becomes dominant in modern Western political
thought up to the present [Rawls 1971, Habermas 1998], with one major
exception,
namely Hegel [Bubner 2002, 167].
Furthermore
Kant's conception
of morality ("Moralität") as opposed to legality
("Legalität")
differs basically from the Aristotelian conception of ethos and
its intimate relation with the written laws of the polis and
(oral)
ethical deliberation. For Kant there is a fundamental difference
between
the law in its relation with an external action (legality), and with
the
internal motivations of such actions (morality) [Kant 1977, 15]. But
this
dichotomy should not be seen as an absolute disconnection between the
objective
sphere of the citizen and the subjective sphere of the person or
between
political action and theoretical thinking. Kant conceives the task of
enlightenment
as the possibility of using our own reason in order to criticise a
given
state of affairs in scientific, religious, moral, and political fields.
At the core of his political philosophy, as developed for instance in
his
famous "Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" [Kant 1964], he
points to the possibility of influencing the "moral condition of the
people"
("Sinnesart des Volks") as well as the "principles of government"
("die Grundsätze der Regierung") through "free thinking" ("freies
Denken"). In order to achieve this, he is less concerned with the
enlargement
of "civil liberty" ("bürgerlicher Freiheit") than with having no
censorship
in the field of the diffusion of scientific ideas on the basis of
written
or, more precisely, of printed works ("Schriften"). This kind
of
liberty is called "liberty of mind of the people" ("Freiheit des
Geistes
des Volks") [Kant 1964, A 61]. In another essay Kant stresses the
social
nature of knowledge in contrast to a solipsistic and idealistic
conception.
He states that we can only think if we can communicate ("mitteilen")
our
thoughts to others and vice versa [Kant 1958, A 325]. In other
words,
the mediation between ethics and public policy is conceived as mainly a
theoretical task to be achieved on the basis of censorship-free and printed
diffusion of critical scientific thinking.
Hegel
criticises Kant's dichotomy
between legality and morality. He conceives the traditional concept of ethos
as the moral substance of the state
("Sittlichkeit") in the
sense of a process of liberty mediated not just through censorship-free
distribution of critical knowledge but through the historical
shaping
of political institutions [Hegel 1976]. According to Marx and Engels
the working class is the real historical mediation
of ethical
ideas and moral ideals [Marx/Engels 1970].
Present
societies, at least
in Western democracies, are basically influenced by contractual, moral
and historical paradigms. Moral traditions build the basis of the
"pacts
and covenants" of democratic constitutions. This is particularly
obvious,
for instance, with regard to such concepts as human dignity or pursuit
of happiness. Both, moral traditions and legal systems are subject to
historical
changes. But modern democracies, including supranational political
structures,
are, of course, neither the "Leviathan" nor the ancient polis.
From
the
beginning of Modernity
ethical reflection takes place within academic institutions as well as
within political bodies, mainly the parliament. These two places
correspond
to the modern distinction between theory and practice. Mass-media,
particularly
the press, play a key role in the mediation between public policy and
the
civil society. Freedom of the press is a conditio sine qua non
of
modern democracies which become increasingly influenced by broadcasting
media (radio and TV). Democracy is more and more a matter of mediocracy.
2
Ethics and Public Policy Within a Digital Networked Environment
In
late 20th
Century the
Internet emerges as a decentralised digital and global medium. Users,
individuals
and groups, can become not only receivers of a hierarchical one-to-many
sender structure as in the case of mass-media but can be at the same
time
senders and receivers with several options: one-to-many, many-to-one,
many-to-many,
some-to-many, one-to-one etc. This digital networked
environment
creates new opportunities for ethical, legal, and political discourse
as
well as for individual and social political action. Beyond the
principles
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press the
question
of freedom of access becomes a key ethical issue of the
so-called
information society in the 21st Century [Capurro
2000].
Modern
society
is also influenced
by revolutionary and accelerated changes in science and technology that
challenge in different ways some basic implicit and explicit moral
assumptions
and legal norms. This is one main reason why there is a growing need
for
ethical reflection on morality and law particularly in the field of
biotechnology.
In the last ten years or so public ethics committees have been created
within the political system in order to give advice to the parliament
as
well as to the executive branches particularly in the fields of
biotechnology
and information technology. Ethics is no longer restricted to academic
institutions but becomes part of the political, legal, and
the social debate as carried out until now mainly through mass-media
and
in the academic sphere. Instead of ethics and public policy we
find
ethics in public policy. In modern democracies ethics is
carried
out in such contexts as:
- the
parliament
- academic
institutions
- the
mass-media
- the
Internet
- public
ethics
committees
Ethics
committees
are set up
not only in the political sphere but also in civil society. In
particular
biotechnology firms have often their own consulting groups. What are
the
functions of such committees? What is their relation to political and
legal
institutions as well as to the public sphere? And how does this
discourse
take place within a digital environment? These are complex questions
that
should be carefully studied not only with regard to the differences
between
the contexts but also with regard to their mutual interactions. In the
following I will only consider the role of ethics bodies within public
policy.
As
modern
science and technology
often challenge basic moral assumptions they provoke directly or
indirectly
a crisis or at least a basic insecurity with regard to moral standards
that are either sanctioned by law or remain tacit presuppositions. In
secularised
societies these conflicts find no longer a solution based on religious
authority, although religion plays an important role in the shaping of
morality. The rise of ethics as a public discourse may be thus
interpreted
as a symptom of the moral crisis arising in complex modern societies
that
can neither be solved by an implicit or explicit moral tradition nor by
a state policy alone. Of course, a common ethos is not based just
on rational discourse. What is new in the present situation is that
ethics
is considered to belong to the public debate at an institutional
political
level.
Public
ethics
committees
are a place in which critical reflection on moral presuppositions of
legal
and political options can take place. Their object (objectum
materiale)
of deliberation are such options and their moral presuppositions
arising
particularly but not exclusively out of new discoveries and inventions
in the fields of biology and biotechnology. Their perspective (objectum
formale) is a scientific not a political one. Public ethics
committees
have a deliberative character, i.e., they do not intend to just
sanction
a given morality and should not be used as political instruments for
moral
control of society. They are supposed to provide a sound and
independent
argumentation and to facilitate judgement that should help politicians
and society to get a more transparent view of the intricacies of
scientific,
technical, and legal issues as seen from an ethical viewpoint. This
kind
of ethics council should not predetermine or even substitute the
political
decision-making that should be carried out in the parliament. Public
ethics
committees also do not substitute the social debate that takes place,
for
instance, in civic face-to-face meetings or in the mass-media
[Düwell
2002]. They are, in other words, instruments for public awareness. They
do not owe per se a specific moral authority. Their
members
should be qualified by their ethical and not only by their
scientific
or legal expertise. Being in between society and public policy within
a digital networked environment, public ethics committees should
use
not only the digital tools offered by the information society for their
own work but they should be also present in the mass-media arena
including
the Internet.
In
June 3, 2002
the German
Federal Foreign Office and the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in conjuction with the National
Ethics Council of the Federal Republic of Germany and the National
Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences of the
French
Republic organised a conference: "Towards
a global bioethic? An intercultural policy dialogue"
and invited 70 persons involved in bioethics from Africa, the Americas,
Asia, Australia and Europe to discuss whether there is a minimum
consensus
on a global bioethics acceptable to all. The final statement of the
conference,
accessible at the web site of the German Federal Foreign Office, is a
good
example of the role of national ethics committees in the international
political discussion. It states, for instance, that "there is a growing
consensus that bioethical and related biopolicy issues need to be
reflected
in an international context taking into account the philosophical,
cultural
and religious values of different societies." The participants stressed
the "necessity for education and capacity building in the field of
bioethics
to develop the ability of the national communities and stake holders to
take informed positions and to establish procedures for ethics review
committees
and informed consent." [Auswärtiges Amt 2002]
3
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies
(EGE)
The
activities
of the European
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies [EGE
2002] are a good example of how a public ethics committee is
deployed
in between society and public policy. In December 1997 the European
Commission
set up the European Group on Ethics (EGE) to succeed the Group of
Advisers
on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology (GAEIB 1991-1997).
During
its first mandate (1998-2000) the EGE provided opinions on subjects as
diverse as human tissue banking, human embryo research, personal health
data in the information society, doping in sport and human stem cell
research.
At a specific request of the President of the Commission, Romano Prodi,
the Group also wrote the "Report on the Charter on Fundamental Rights"
related to technological innovation. On 24 April 2001 the Commission
has
appointed twelve members for the period 2001-2004 and amended the EGE
remit
in order to strengthen the role of the Group.
EGE
is an
independent, pluralist
and multidisciplinary body which advises the European Commission on
ethical
aspects of science and new technologies in connection with the
preparation
and implementation of Community legislation or policies. The Group may
prepare an "Opinion" either at the request of the Commission or on its
own initiative. The Parliament and the Council may draw the
Commission's
attention to questions which they consider of major ethical importance.
The members are appointed for their expertise and personal qualities.
They
come from different countries and are experts in disciplines such as
biology
and genetics, medicine, informatics, law, philosophy or theology.
The
Group’s
regular working
meetings are not open to the public. For the purposes of preparing its
"Opinions" and within the limits of the available resources for this
action,
the Group may invite experts either from a Member State of the Union or
from outside to take part in its proceedings on a given topic on the
agenda,
initiate studies in order to collect all necessary scientific and
technical
information, set up working groups to consider specific issues, and
organise
public round tables in order to promote dialogue and improve
transparency.
In future the Group will establish closer links with representatives of
the various ethics bodies which exist in the European Union and in the
applicant countries.
The
preparatory
work for
the creation of such "Opinions" includes monthly face-to-face meetings
as well as exchanges particularly on e-mail basis. The Group works
closely
with the EGE Secretariat using all instruments of the digital age.
Every
opinion is published immediately after its adoption. Where an "Opinion"
is not adopted unanimously, it includes any dissenting point of view.
The
"Opinions" are made known at a press conference and distributed to the
Member States. They are also accessible at the EGE web site. The Group
was presented by arte in the series "Forum des
européens:
Embryons pour guérir" in January 21, 2002.
Conclusion
Modern
science
and technology
challenge basic philosophic assumptions and provoke thus directly or
indirectly
a crisis or at least a basic insecurity with regard to moral standards
that were either sanctioned by law or remained tacit moral
presuppositions.
The rise of ethics within the political arena may be interpreted as a
symptom
of a moral crisis within modern societies. The role of public ethics
committees
should be one of strengthening the capacity of reflection being
traditionally
done in such places as the parliament, the academic sphere and the
mass-media.
It
would be a moralistic
fallacy to conceive this activity as a kind of control of ethics on
politics or even on society [Vollrath 1996]. Ethics, public policy and
society should be regarded as relatively independent and interactive
spheres.
Otherwise ethics committees may become less a challenge than a danger
for
responsible autonomous political decision-making. Ambitious ethical
universality
may also forget the difficult historical process of creating a common ethos
where differences are not just tolerated but respected as an essential
characteristic of humanity.
Acknowledgements
Thanks
to
Thomas J. Froehlich
(Kent State University, USA) and Martha Smith (Drexel University, USA)
for questions and corrections.
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Last
update: June 22,
2017